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 Aporia of the Historiography of American Populism 
 YOKOYAMA Ryo ＊ 
 Preface 
 　 “A specter is haunting the world―populism,” a parody of famous words of 
 Communist Manifesto (1848), are appropriate lines expressing the sentiment 
dominating the present-day world.  However, we can find this phrase in the 
introduction to Ghita Ionescu & Ernest Gellner eds.  Populism: Its Meaning and 
National Characteristics (1969), which was published as a collection of papers 
presented at the international symposium on populism held in London in 1967.  It 
is at this moment, I conjecture, that “populism” appeared in the international 
scholarly discussions for the first time.  Anyway, in retrospect, it was a particularly 
important starting point for the study of populisms across the world. 
 　 As I will discuss it later, the most important intended object of this symposium 
was to define “what is populism?” However, scholars attending the symposium 
failed to reach any agreement about it at that time.  Afterwards, quite a few 
scholars have been incessantly struggling with it, presenting some categorization 
of populisms or extracting some characteristics of them, but never to reach any 
agreed definition of populism.  The definition of populism still remains quite a 
conundrum like one of the millennium prize problems in mathematics. 1 
 　 However, this symposium signifies scholars seemed to begin to recognize there 
are types of populisms around the world other than the Populist Movement in 
America around the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.  That’s why 
they, besides the term “Populism” (with capital letter P), started to use the term 
“populism” (the letter p in lower case), whose versatility, I am afraid, seems to 
reflect and escalate the confusion about the definition of populism. 
 　 Right now, among American historians engaging in the study of populism, 
＊ Professor Emeritus, Kobe University. This paper is based on the special lecture on “Populism 
and populism: Aporia of the Historiography of American Populism,” delivered at Nanzan 
University on July 8, 2017.
 1. Ghita Ionescu & Ernest Gellner, eds.,  Populism: Its Meaning and National 
Characteristics (New York: Macmillan, 1969); Margaret Canovan,  Populism (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981).
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there seems to be found some agreement that there is a distinct research field of 
populisms from that of the Populist Movement.  I assume the term populism might 
diverge from the term Populism, somewhere along the way of the historiography 
of American populism.  No other historiography of the fields of American history 
has been so staggered by political upheavals as that of American Populist 
Movement.  In this paper, I will trace the meandering course history writing on the 
Populist Movement followed and an unwitting divergence of populisms along the 
way. 2 
 　 One of the peculiarities of the historiography of American populism is that 
historians writing on the Populist Movement at the turn of the century appear 
reluctant or even evasive about engaging in the study of other kinds of populisms 
in U.S. as well as in the globe, distinguishing themselves from those interested in 
other kinds of populisms.  I do believe this attitude of scholars to be shortsighted 
and unproductive, agreeing with Michael Kazin that the study of American 
populisms, the Populist Movement as a part of them, could immensely contribute 
to the in-depth understanding of one of the traditional American political cultures. 3 
 　 At the opening of his book, Michael Kazin presented his own definition of 
populism as follows: “a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as 
a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as 
self-serving and undemocratic, and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.” 4 
Modifying his, let me propose my own; “a language / an idea / a style / a 
movement (/＝ and or), whose speakers / conceivers / performers / activists, 
believing themselves to be true people, view the elite opponents as self-serving, 
undemocratic and immoral, and to seek to mobilize the former against the latter.” 
 　 Applying this definition, there could be found a variety of kinds of populisms, 
from full-featured ones like the Populist Movement to those empty of any 
movement like Donald Trump’s campaign. 
 I:  Historiography of the Populist Movement 5 
 1.  The beginning: In the clamor of “demagogues” 
 　 The Populist Movement, a radical reform movement by farmers, workers, and 
 2. Michael Kazin,  The Populist Persuasion: An American History (New York: Basic 
Books, 1995), 5 ― 6; “ Agricultural History Round Table on Populism: Robert C. McMath, Jr., 
Peter H. Argersinger, Connie L. Lester, Michael F. Magliari, and Walter Nugent,”  Agricultural 
History 82, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 19.
 3. Kazin,  Populist Persuasion , 5 ― 6.
 4. Kazin,  Populist Persuasion , 1.
 5. I referred to the following three review articles: William F. Holmes, “Populism: In Search 
of Context,”  Agricultural History 64, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 26 ― 58; Worth Robert Miller, “A 
Centennial Historiography of American Populism,”  Kansas History 16, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 54 ―
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middle class citizens to realize “the cooperative commonwealth” in America, 
started in the late 1870s, rose to the national political arena, founding People’s 
Party of America in 1892, fought the 1896 presidential campaign, appointing 
William Jennings Bryan, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, as 
their own, only to suffer a fatal defeat, declining with intraparty strife, finally 
disappeared nationally after 1908 presidential election. 
 　 The study of the Populist Movement began the moment “the threat of 
Populism” reached its climax in 1896.  Frank L. McVey, the instructor in 
economics in the University of Minnesota, published an article entitled “The 
Populist Movement,” where he characterized Populism “as a class movement” of 
“men engaged in agriculture” frustrated by economic grievances.  He also 
criticized its socialistic tendencies, reflecting the negative approaches or fear of 
the establishment clamoring the danger of populists as “demagogues,” 
“anarchists,” or “socialists.” 6 
 2.  Progressive interpretation of Populism 
 　 During the Age of Reform from the Progressive Movement through New Deal, 
Populism’s reputation among the scholars had been almost reversed from the 
dangerous demagogic movement to the forerunner of the Progressivism. 
 　 Frederick Jackson Turner, the pioneer of the frontier thesis, though considering 
Populists to be coarse frontier farmers, sent a sympathetic glance to their 
hardships.  Vernon L. Parrington, himself a Populist in his youth in Kansas, saw 
the Populism as “a militant political uprising with a definite party program and 
organization,” and the fight of 1896 as “the last mortal struggle between 
agrarianism and capitalism.” Charles A. Beard, the Titan of the progressive 
historians, considered Populism to be a left-wing agrarian movement that, 
attracting some part of labor forces, was to work as a forerunner of anti-monopoly 
fight of the Progressive Movement. 
 　 John D. Hicks’  The Populist Revolt (1931) still stands as an invaluable classic 
of Progressive historiography of Populism.  Narrating the rise, decline, and fall of 
the Populist Movement, he esteemed it highly in that it left significant legacies 
inherited by the Progressive Movement. 
 　 Finally, we should never fail to refer to C. Vann Woodward’s monumental 
work,  Tom Watson (1938), where he depicted the tragedy of a Populist turned 
extreme racist.  He, nevertheless, emphasized the progressive and humane 
characteristics of Populism testified by their life or death struggle to promote the 
 69; “ Agricultural History Round Table on Populism,” 1 ― 35.
 6. Frank L. McVey, “The Populist Movement,”  Economic Studies 1, no. 3 (1896): 127 ―
 209.
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cooperation across the color line between whites and blacks. 7 
 3.  Bashing of Populism: In the midst of the storm of McCarthyism 
 　 In the aftermath of the Second World War, the opening of the Cold War as well 
as the conservatization of American society drew the established image of 
Populism as a progressive movement into the violent bashing by intellectuals as 
one of the assumed roots of American fascism.  From this turmoil, however, 
almost by chance, there arose the concept of “populisms,” too. 
 　 In the midst of McCarthyism storming American society 1950 through 1954, 
American intellectuals, especially those of New-Deal leftists turned liberal or 
conservative after the war (“pluralists,” Michael P. Rogin called them), were so 
frightened by this pageant like a “popular tribunal” that they had begun to locate 
the roots of McCarthyism in American history as well as in American society. 8 
 　 Facing this storm, Richard Hofstadter, one of the New-Deal leftists turned 
liberal, and the leading spirit of this approach, published  The Age of Reform 
(1955).  In this ever-controversial masterpiece, he attempted to interpret the 
Populist Movement at the turn of the century by introducing Freudian 
psychological analytical methods such as a concept of status politics or that of 
paranoid style.  Arguing Populism was not caused by economic hardships, but by 
status anxiety hoarded by property-owning farmers, he suggested Populists were 
tarnished with intolerant political culture such as conspiracy theory, anti-Semitism, 
or nativism, which all might originate from a paranoid style.  After all, he 
characterized Populism as a Yanus-faced movement with two concurrent strands, 
one being backward-looking and dreaming of the revival of agrarian Eden (“soft” 
side), the other forward-looking, immersed in interest group politics (“hard” 
side). 9 
 　 In  The Age of Reform , Hofstadter neither referred to Joseph McCarthy nor 
McCarthyism, and mentioned Father Charles E. Coughlin and Huey Long only 
once for each.  However, the ideas of paranoid style, or that of status politics he 
introduced were immediately appropriated by horrified intellectuals around him to 
investigate McCarthyism.  More than that, he might be misunderstood to have 
 7. F. J. Turner, “The Problem of the West,”  The Atlantic Monthly (September 1896): 289 ―
 97; Charles A. Beard,  The American Party Battle (New York: Macmillan, 1928); Charles A. 
Beard and Mary R. Beard,  The Beards’ New Basic History of the United States (Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday, 1960); V. L. Parrington,  Main Currents in American Thought, Vol. III (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1930), 265 ― 66; J. D. Hicks,  The Populist Revolt: History of 
the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1931); C. Vann Woodward,  Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York: Macmillan, 1938).
 8. Daniel Bell, ed.,  The New American Right (New York: Criterion Books, 1955).
 9. Richard Hofstadter,  The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1955).
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suggested that McCarthyism had originated from the Populist Movement. 10 
 4.  Criticism of  The Age of Reform 
 　 While  The Age of Reform was applauded feverishly as “the most influential 
book ever published on the history of twentieth-century America” (Alan Brinkley), 
or as “framed the problems, explored the techniques, and established the model of 
literate inquiry that would condition our study of the American past” (Robert H. 
Wiebe), 11 its stinging impact would incite fierce criticism by historians as well as 
by political scientists. 
 　 Among them, stood up C. Vann Woodward, the master of the American 
southern history, criticizing some of the important points Hofstadter presented. 
 　 First, he denied Populism was a status politics, insisting it was rather an 
agrarian interest politics.  Second, admitting that Populists were more or less 
imbued with intolerant political cultures like conspiracy theory, he argued it was 
just common in the contemporary Amarican society at large.  Considering this 
adversity, he maintained, it was rather admirable of them to make progressive 
efforts to work out some interracial cooperation.  Finally, warning against 
maneuvers to connect Populism with McCarthyism, he invited intellectuals to 
stand for the defense of the tradition of reform movements in U.S. like Populism. 
 　 Historian David Potter joined the criticism of Hofstadter by pointing out some 
vulnerability of the documentation of his work and questioning the validity of the 
idea of status politics, while admitting the utility of the idea of the “soft”-side 
(interest group politics) of Populism. 
 　 In the course of the following frequent correspondences with Woodward or 
Potter, Hofstadter, accepting some criticism by them, withdrew the idea of status 
politics, refrained from referring to the “soft” side of Populism, instead 
emphasized its “hard” side.  He, however, maintaining both the interest in 
“irrational” phenomena, or movements in history or society, and the idea of 
paranoid style as an analytical tool, turned his academic attention to the emerging 
new right movements like the John Birch Society or Barry Goldwater’s. 12 
 10. Victor C. Ferkiss, “Populist Influences on American Fascism,”  Western Political 
Quarterly 10, no. 2 (June 1957): 350 ― 73; Peter Viereck, “The Revolt Against the Elite,” in  The 
New American Right , ed. Daniel Bell.
 11. Cited in David S. Brown,  Richard Hofstadter: An Intellectual Biography (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 99.
 12. C. Vann Woodward, “The Populist Heritage and the Intellectual,”  The American Scholar 
29, no. 1 (Winter 1959 ― 1960): 55 ― 72; Robert M. Collins, “The Originality Trap: Richard 
Hofstadter on Populism,”  Journal of American History 76, no. 1 (June 1989): 150 ― 67; David S. 
Brown,  Richard Hofstadter , 99 ― 119.
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 5.  The vindication of Populism 
 　 Responding to the call by Woodward, scholars stood for the defense and 
vindication of Populism.  Among them, historian Norman Pollack led the 
discussion.  Severely criticizing the historians like Hofstadter who wrote critically 
on Populism, he contended, they did so from a fear of man, rather than as a 
response to McCarthyism as Woodward suggested, and argued Populists rather 
had an affirmation of man, a faith in man’s capability to shape his own history. 
Populists, he maintained, were never backward-looking, rather borrowed 
selectively from the past to realize an ideal society like even a socialistic one.  He 
concluded “Populism stands as the conscience of modern America ... we should 
look to that heritage and take pride in what we see.” 13 
 　 Another historian Walter Nugent joined the defense of Populism to prove that 
Populists were neither anti-Semitic nor nativistic by statistically analyzing the 
parameters of Kansas Populism. 14 
 　 Concurrently with historians, political scientist Michael Paul Rogin refuted the 
argument that there might be some connections between Populism and 
McCarthyism by analyzing election data of Wisconsin, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota.  McCarthyism, he argued, reflecting the uneasiness about Korean War or 
the fear of communism, was neither fascism nor movement originated from 
Populism as pluralistic intellectuals feared it to be. 15 
 　  The Age of Reform , stimulating more arguments, for or against, provided a 
great impetus to the study of the Populist Movement.  Afterward, scholars couldn’t 
help discussing the arguments Hofstadter presented. 
 　 After all, so far, among the arguments Hofstadter presented, excepting the one 
about the “hard”-side (inclination to interest politics) of Populism, those ideas of 
paranoid style, status politics, intolerance, and backward-looking, all seem to have 
been in skeptical review.  The idea of backward-looking, however, suggesting the 
existence of nineteenth-century republicanism in Populism, views shared also by 
new-left historians, still seems to be open for further discussion. 
 13. N. Pollack, “Fear of Man: Populism, Authoritarianism, and the Historian,”  Agricultural 
History 39, no. 2 (April 1965): 59 ― 74; N. Pollack,  The Populist Response to Industrial 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).
 14. W. T. K. Nugent, “Some Parameters of Populism,”  Agricultural History 40, no. 4 
(October 1966): 255 ― 70; W.T.K. Nugent,  The Tolerant Populists: Kansas Populism and 
Nativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
 15. Michael P. Rogin,  The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1967).
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 6.  New-lefts’ Populists: The dream of cooperative commonwealth again 
 　 In the 1960s and the early 1970s when civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam 
War protest surged up, New-left historians, searching for the idea in the past to 
radically reform American society dominated by bureaucratic corporate state order 
(New-Deal liberalism), entered the study of the Populist Movement. 
 　 Christopher Lasch took the initiative.  In his book  The Agony of the American 
Left (1966), he criticized Norman Pollack for his misunderstanding of Populism 
as socialistic.  Populists, he argued, unlike socialists, having no idea of class as 
objective reality, were rather sophisticated economic determinists like Charles A. 
Beard. “American populists have always been easy prey to disillusionment, when 
hopes of speedy change turn to dust.  This explains why so many populists of the 
nineties turned into cranky demagogues in their later years―a recurrent pattern in 
the history of populism.” 16 
 　 Notwithstanding his critical view of populism, Lasch esteemed it highly as 
deriving from the physiocratic tradition and from the democracy of Jefferson, 
Jackson, and Lincoln, and hoped it would reawaken the democratic instinct in 
middle-class Americans possessed with self-contempt. 
 　 His argument, made more than half a century ago, still provides us with 
exceptionally useful suggestions concerning the structure of populist ideology, the 
relationship between populism and demagoguery, and the existence of populisms 
through American history. 17 
 　 Lawrence Goodwyn wrote  Democratic Promise (1976), a monumental 
narrative of the Populist Movement by a new-left historian.  Applying the idea of 
“movement culture” presented by English historian E. P. Thompson to American 
Populism, he insisted there could be found a current of movement culture in the 
movement, representing the grassroots participatory democracy, expressed in the 
form of cooperative movements or political educational program.  He narrates the 
course the Populist Movement took as a rivalry between southern Populism 
supported by effective movement culture (“genuine movement”) and northern 
Populism with just weak movement culture (“shadow movement”), the latter 
overshadowing the former finally to appoint W. J. Bryan, a detestable 
“compromise” leading to the collapse of the movement.  The demise of Populism, 
he declared, meant not only the defeat of the dream of “the cooperative 
commonwealth,” but also the triumph of emerging corporate state order that had 
started as the Progressive Movement and was succeeded by New Deal liberalism 
to be continued to present-day America. 
 16. Christopher Lasch,  The Agony of the American Left: One Hundred Years of Radicalism 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1973), 17 ― 19.
 17. Christopher Lasch,  The Agony of the American Left , 18.
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 　 He criticized both of Hicks and Hofstadter for slighting the southern Populism. 
More than that, his declaration of discontinuity between Populism and 
Progressivism meant a direct negation of Hick’s argument that the former’s legacy 
was succeeded by the latter. 
 　 In other place, Goodwyn argued Populists’ vision of idealistic economic 
system was neither capitalistic nor socialistic, but “market socialism,” where there 
are combined a private ownership of means of production like land, and a public 
ownership or control of the means of transportation and exchange such as 
railroads and currency.  This vision as an alternative to capitalism or socialism, he 
maintains, could be applied to present-day world searching for a new way to 
humane society.   Furthermore, he depicted sympathetically the tragic efforts made 
by southern Populist to realize interracial cooperation between blacks and 
whites. 18 
 　 Goodwyn’s  Democratic Promise , representing the culmination of new-lefts’ 
study of Populism, also has been serving as a torchlight for scholars to ascertain 
where they are standing. 
 7.  Flowering Populism study: The 1980s on 
 　 In the 1980s, when the so-called “Reagan Revolution” started, the study of 
American Populism witnessed a spectacular development.  Factors other than 
caution against the Reagan regime, such as rise of multi-culturalism, broadened 
interest in social history in general, the impact of Lawrence Goodwyn’s book in 
particular, all seemed to combine to give a great impetus to expand and deepen the 
study of Populism. 
 　 First of all, as for the Populists’ vision of an ideal society, Bruce Palmer, 
making a sweeping research of the ideology of southern Populists―rank and file 
as well as leaders―held, concluded that they envisioned a “two-tiered” economic 
system where there are combined a private ownership of the means of production 
and a public ownership of the means of transportation and exchange, which was 
quite similar to Goodwyn’s idea of market socialism.  However, Palmer disagrees 
with Goodwyn in that the Populists’ vision was within the framework of 
capitalism.   Norman Pollack, modifying his former contention that Populists’ 
mind was socialistic, came to call it “democratic capitalism.” 19 
 18. Lawrence Goodwyn,  Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Lawrence Goodwyn, “The Cooperative Commonwealth 
& Other Abstractions: In Search of a Democratic Promise,”  Marxist Perspectives 10 (Summer 
1980): 42; Lawrence Goodwyn, “Populist Dreams and Negro Rights: East Texas as a Case,” 
 The American Historical Review 76, no. 5 (December 1971): 1435 ― 56.
 19. Bruce Palmer, “ Man Over Money”: The Southern Populist Critique of American 
Capitalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Norman Pollack,  The 
Humane Economy: Populism, Capitalism, and Democracy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
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 　 Some historians, probing the origins of the Populists’ critique of capitalism, 
arguably have found that southern farmers held an ideology like the idea of “moral 
economy” that again E. P. Thompson insisted he identified in English history. 
Steven Hahn has contended that he found it in the struggle waged by Georgia’s 
upcountry farmers over the fence-law, or the stock-law that banned free foraging 
of stock on the common pasture.  Robert C. McMath, Jr., taking as a case northern 
Texas farmers’ protest against barbed-wire that damaged free foraging on the 
common, suggested there could be found a similar mentality there. 20 
 　 Criticizing Goodwyn for not paying enough attention to class relation where 
Populists were situated, such sociologists as Donna Barnes and Scott McNall also 
have joined the discussion to activate the study from the viewpoint of class 
analysis, class conflict, or political mobilization. 21 
 　 Turning to the regions these current studies covered, we have witnessed a 
marvelous expansion and deepening of the study of Populism on the state-level or 
the regional level.  Among them, in part because Goodwyn paid (too) much 
attention to southern Populism, we have literally countless state by state studies 
thereof, although works treating southern Populism as a whole as Woodward or 
Goodwyn did, are yet to be written. 22  Furthermore, we have seen a remarkable 
University Press, 1991). In  The Populist Moment , an abridged edition of  Democratic Promise , 
Goodwyn contends that the Farmers’ Alliance’s idea of cooperative commonwealth was within 
the framework of capitalism. Lawrence Goodwyn,  The Populist Moment: A Short History of 
the Agrarian Revolt in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 90.
 20. Steven Hahn,  The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the 
Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850 ― 1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1983); Robert C. McMath, Jr., “Sandy Land and Hogs in the Timber: (Agri)cultural Origins of 
the Farmers’ Alliance in Texas,” in  The Countryside in the Age of Capitalist Transformation: 
Essays in the Social History of Rural America , eds. Steven Hahn and Jonathan Prude (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 205 ― 29; Robert C. McMath, Jr.,  American 
Populism: A Social History, 1877 ― 1898 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993). McMath’s book is 
the newest and an excellent narrative of American Populism.
 21. Donna A. Barnes,  Farmers in Rebellion: The Rise and Fall of the Southern Farmers 
Alliance and People’s Party in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984); Scott G. 
McNall,  The Road to Rebellion: Class Formation and Kansas Populism, 1865 ― 1900 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988).
 22. For the South as a whole, see James M. Beeby, ed.,  Populism in the South Revisited: 
New Interpretations and New Departures (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2012); 
Michael Perman,  Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888 ― 1908 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); for Alabama, see Samuel L. Webb,  Two-Party 
Politics in the One-Party South: Alabama’s Hill County, 1874 ― 1920 (Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press, 1997); Glenn Feldman,  The Disfranchisement Myth: Poor Whites and Suffrage 
Restriction in Alabama (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2004); for Arkansas, see Fon 
Louise Gordon,  Caste & Class, The Black Experience in Arkansas, 1890 ― 1920 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1995); for Louisiana, see Donna A. Barnes,  The Louisiana 
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accumulation of works on Populism in the Mountain West and on the Pacific 
Coast. 23  Yet, we have not seen any comparable increment of works on the 
movements in the Midwest or Great Plains, areas once called “the hotbed of 
Populism.” Therefore, Jeffrey Ostler, pointing out the crucial importance of 
interparty competition in the states, by comparing three Great Plains states, 
Kansas (Populist state), Nebraska (Populist state), and Iowa (non-Populist state), 
all of which were struck by the same economic hardship, should be given the 
greatest credit of contributing to the advance of the Populism study there, I dare 
say. 24 
 　 As for the genres current scholars are engaging in, it is no wonder interest in 
racial relationship or black Populism in the southern Populism has been enhanced 
Populist Movement, 1881 ― 1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011); for 
Mississippi, see Stephen Cresswell,  Multi-party Politics in Mississippi, 1877 ― 1902 (Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 1995); Stephen Cresswell,  Rednecks, Redeemers, and Race: 
Mississippi after Reconstruction, 1877 ― 1917 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006); 
for North Carolina, see James L. Hunt,  Marion Butler and American Populism (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Kent Redding,  Making Race, Making Power: North 
Carolina’s Road to Disfranchisement (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); James M. 
Beeby,  Revolt of the Tar Heels: The North Carolina Populist Movement, 1890 ― 1901 (Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 2008); for Oklahoma, see John Thompson,  Closing the 
Frontier: Radical Response in Oklahoma, 1889 ― 1923 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1986); Worth Robert Miller,  Oklahoma Populism: A History of the People’s Party in the 
Oklahoma Territory (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987); for South Carolina, see 
Stephen Kantrowitz,  Ben Tillman and the Reconstruction of White Supremacy (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000); for Tennessee, see Connie L. Lester,  Up From the 
Mudsills of Hell: The Farmers’ Alliance, Populism, and Progressive Agriculture in Tennessee, 
1870 ― 1915 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006).
 23. Robert W. Larson,  Populism in the Mountain West (Albuquerque, NM: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1986); William Joseph Gaboury,  Dissension in the Rockies: A History of 
Idaho Populism (New York: Garland, 1988); Thomas W. Riddle,  The Old Radicalism: John R. 
Rogers and the Populist Movement in Washington (New York: Garland, 1991); David B. 
Griffiths,  Populism in the Western United States, 1890 ― 1900 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1992); Marilyn P. Watkins,  Rural Democracy: Family Farmers and Politics in Western 
Washington, 1890 ― 1925 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); David R. Berman, 
 Radicalism in the Mountain West, 1890 ― 1920 (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2007); 
John S. McCormick and John R. Sillito,  A History of Utah Radicalism: Startling, Socialistic, 
and Decidedly Revolutionary (Logan, Utah: Utah State University Press, 2011).
 24. Jeffrey Ostler,  Prairie Populism: The Fate of Agrarian Radicalism in Kansas, Nebraska 
and Iowa, 1880 ― 1892 (Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, 1993); Peter H. 
Argersinger,  The Limits of Agrarian Radicalism: Western Populism and American Politics 
(Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Michael Pierce,  Striking with the Ballot: 
Ohio Labor and the Populist Party (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010); R. 
Alton Lee,  Principle over Party: The Farmers’ Alliance and Populism in South Dakota, 1880 ―
 1900 (Pierre, SD: South Dakota State Historical Society Press, 2011).
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as a result of popularity of southern Populism as a topic. 25 
 　 Currently, scholars have been giving increasing attention to other participants 
of the movements than farmers, such as urban workers and middle class citizens 
in the South as well as in the West, or mine workers in the Mountain West.  As a 
focal point of these trends, Knights of Labor has been attracting more scholars 
afresh. 26 
 　 Reflecting the suggestion made by quite a few historians that there lay an 
inseparable relationship between Populism and Christianity, not least 
evangelicalism, some have attempted to investigate it by taking southern Populism 
as a case, or by following the career of William Jennings Bryan as “A Godly 
Hero.” 27 
 　 Discussion about the relationship between Populism and gender, the weakest 
point, or even the missing link of master narratives by Hicks, Hofstadter, or 
Goodwyn, have been accelerated by historians emphasizing women’s positive 
initiative and active agency in the movements. 28 
 8.  Revival of Hicks’ paradigm? From the 1990s to the present 
 　 After almost one and a quarter century have passed since the study of the 
Populist Movement in the United States started, present studies of Populism is in 
the strange cohabitation of liveliness and tranquility.  While Populism is still one 
of the most popular and the most prolific research fields, nevertheless, we have 
never regained the enthusiasm like one once Hofstadter’s  The  Age of Reform or 
Goodwyn’s  Democratic Promise aroused.  This is, I conjure, in part because 
Goodwyn’s paradigm once expected to replace Hicks’ as a grand narrative went 
 25. Omar H. Ali,  In the Balance of Power: Independent Black Politics and Third-Party 
Movements in the United States (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008); Omar H. Ali,  In 
the Lion’s Mouth: Black Populism in the New South, 1886 ― 1900 (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2010).
 26. Matthew Hild,  Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, and Populists: Farmer-Labor 
Insurgency in the Late-Nineteenth-Century South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007); 
Joseph Gerteis,  Class and The Color Line: Interracial Class Coalition in the Knights of Labor 
and the Populist Movement (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Robert D. Johnston,  The 
Radical Middle Class: Populist Democracy and the Question of Capitalism in Progressive Era 
Portland, Oregon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
 27. Joe Creech,  Righteous Indignation: Religion, and Populist Revolution (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2006); Michael Kazin,  A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings 
Bryan (New York: Knopf, 2006).
 28. Michael Lewis Goldberg,  An Army of Women: Gender and Politics in Gilded Age 
Kansas (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Brook Speer Orr,  The 
‘People’s Joan of Arc’: Mary Elizabeth Lease, Gendered Politics, and Populist Party Politics 
in the Gilded-Age America (New York: Peter Lang, 2014).
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unsuccessful after all.
　  Goodwyn’s idea of movement culture as a backbone of his scheme, expressed 
in the form of cooperative movement or political education program, was 
subjected under scrutiny by historians.  Historian Stanley Parsons and others 
proved, by analyzing the management records, that scope and effectiveness of the 
cooperative movement was limited.  Their contention turned out to be a 
considerable blow to Goodwyn, who has never attempted to rebuke it by showing 
new evidences. 29  On the other hand, though other historians like Theodore 
Mitchell or Charles Postel argued favorably for the substantiality of political 
education program of Populism, we should still inquire what ideology Populists 
tried to convey through their political education.  Critics have argued that 
Populists did not need any other movement culture than what they already had 
acquired; anti-monopolism, producerism, or republicanism.  This criticism, I do 
assume, could be supplemented favorably by David Montgomery’s discussion of 
labor republicanism, or Eric Foner’s idea of free labor ideology. 30 
 　 Goodwyn’s  Democratic Promise has invited other criticism than that on 
movement culture.  Making too much of southern Populism, he deemed the 
movements outside of the South as “shadow movements” infected with “free 
silver” illusion.  Considering the progress of study of Populism in the Mountain 
West as well as on the Pacific Coast, his scheme seems to be obliged to expand its 
scope and catch them in sight. 31 
 　 Some have criticized Goodwyn for projecting too much his critical view of the 
contemporary America into his narration of American Populism.  It is not the act 
of projection, I believe, but whether his discussion is valid or not that should be 
disputed.  Is his idea of “market socialism” actually valid for the alternative to 
capitalism or socialism, as well as for the interpretive point of view of Populism? 
More than that, is his criticism of New-Deal liberalism, considered to be a 
foundation of his discussion, still usable now that right wing populists have 
deceptively appropriated it? 
 　 Behind this stalling stage where Goodwyn’s paradigm is tottering, while 
discussion goes ever diversified and segmented, we might see the American left, 
including New-left, wavering over the course to take. 
 29. Stanley B. Parsons, Karen Toombs Parsons, Walter Killilae, and Beverly Borgers, “The 
Role of Cooperatives in the Development of the Movement Culture of Populism,”  Journal of 
American History 69, no. 4 (March 1983): 866 ― 85.
 30. Theodore R. Mitchell,  Political Education in the Southern Farmers’ Alliance, 1887 ―
 1900 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Charles Postel,  The Populist Vision 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Miller, “A Centennial Historiography,” 65 ― 68; 
David Montgomery,  Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862 ― 1872 (New 
York: Knopf, 1967); Eric Foner,  Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the 
Republican Party before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
 31. Larson,  Populism in the Mountain West , 9.
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 　 In this standstill, we see Hicks’ paradigm reviving as if to regain its status as a 
dominant grand narrative.  Beginning in the 1990s, scholars have been reaffirming 
the continuity between Populism and Progressivism by proving many of Populists’ 
programs were realized by the efforts of reform forces, which verifies not only 
Hicks’ argument, but also Hofstadter’s “hard” side hypothesis. 32 
 　 Indeed, Hicks’  The Populist Revolt is a well-balanced standard narrative, but, 
during more than eighty years after its publication, we have accumulated a vast 
amount of much diversified and deepened works on Populism.  It’s high time, I 
believe, to write a new grand narrative to replace Hicks, reflecting them. 
 　 Now, history writing on Populism is faced with the third serious challenge 
preceded by bashing in the time of McCarthyism and Goodwyn’s radical thrust,  
the challenge of right-wing populism.  German political scientist Jan-Werner 
Müller characterizing populists as anti-pluralistic, has declared neither Populists 
nor Bernie Sanders to be populists, or specters, because they are freed from anti-
pluralism. 33 
 　 Would the scholars of Populism (the Populist Movement) be contented to 
accept this verdict of “not guilty”? We should, I’m convinced, refuse to take such 
an ahistorical standpoint to understand populism, one of the pivotal traditional 
political cultures, running all through American history from the colonial era to 
the present, and along the way, involving the Populist Movement as its integral 
part.  We should, and can write a history of American populism.  Actually, I 
believe efforts to write it have already been started.  Referring to them, I will 
show a sketch of the historiography of American populism to date as follows. 
 II:  Historiography of American populism 34 
 1.  Origin of the study of populism: American intellectuals 
 　 When did people begin to call other political movements than the Populist 
 32. Martin Ridge, “Populism Redux: John D. Hicks and The Populist Revolt,” Reviews in 
American History 13, no.1 (March 1985): 142-154; Elisabeth S. Clemens,  The People’s Lobby: 
Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890 ―
 1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Gene Clanton,  Congressional Populism 
and the Crisis of the 1890s (Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Elizabeth 
Sanders,  Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877 ― 1917 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999); Postel,  Populist Vision ; “ Agricultural History Round Table 
on Populism,” 1 ― 35.
 33. Jan-Werner Müller,  What is Populism? (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2016), 85 ― 93.
 34. C. Vann Woodward, “The Ghost Of Populism Walks Again,”  The New York Times 
Magazine , June 4, 1972,  http://www.nytimes.com/1972/06/04/archives/the-ghost-of-populism-
walks-again-the-new-populists.html?nyytmobile=0 . This article is exceptionally suggestive to 
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Movement in the United States “populism”? When did scholars start to identify 
them as an object of their research? I do presume we have two origins of the idea 
of “populism”; McCarthyism and the international symposium on populism in 
1967 I introduced in the preface. 
 　 Facing McCarthyism, former leftist intellectuals, searching for its historical or 
social origins, published a collection of their essays,  The New American Right 
(1955). 35  Richard Hofstadter, leading the authors, wrote “The Pseudo-
Conservative Revolt,” where he, calling McCarthy’s supporters “pseudo-
conservatives,” attempted to understand their motivation by applying a 
psychological concept of “status politics” instead of class politics.  He also 
suggested this concept would be applicable to the K.K.K. in the 1920s too, when 
economy was in the boom as in the 1950s. 
 　 Strange to say, in this essay, Hofstadter made no mention of the Populist 
Movement.  Yet, in the ending, he warned gravely as follows. “In a populistic 
culture like ours, which seems to lack a responsible elite with political and moral 
autonomy, and in which it is possible to exploit the wildest currents of public 
sentiment for private purposes, it is at least conceivable that a highly organized, 
vocal, active and well-financed minority could create a political climate in which 
the rational pursuit of our well-being and safety would become impossible.” 36 
This warning seems to be worth sincerely appreciating now that we are facing 
Trump’s triumph. 
 　 In  The New Right , it is not Hofstadter, but historian and poet Peter Viereck that 
associated McCarthyism with the Populist Movement.  In his essay, “The Revolt 
Against the Elite,” Viereck, considering McCarthyism to be a revolt against the 
elite, castigated it as “it is a Populism gone sour; this time it lacks the generous, 
idealistic, social reformist instincts which partly justified the original Populists.” 37 
From this statement, we could see he became aware of the existence of other 
populism than the original Populism. 
 　 In  The Radical Right (1963), a revised and expanded edition of  The New Right , 
Hofstadter wrote a short supplementary essay to the original one, where he, 
withdrawing the concept of status politics, instead introduced the idea of 
“fundamentalism” to explain the New Right movements like the John Birch 
Society.  Yet, here again, he never referred to the Populist Movement. 38 
 　 In the same edition, editor Daniel Bell, writing a new chapter entitled “The 
Dispossessed,” declared “the radical right of the early 1960s is no way different 
lead my discussion.
 35. Daniel Bell, ed.,  New American Right .
 36. Daniel Bell, ed.,  The Radical Right  (Garden City, NY; Doubleday, 1963), ⅸ; Daniel 
Bell, ed.,  New American Right , 53 ― 54, 166 ― 233.
 37. Daniel Bell, ed.,  New American Right , 95.
 38. Daniel Bell, ed.,  Radical Right , 97 ― 103.
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from the Populists of the 1890s, who for years traded successfully on such simple 
formulas as ‘Wall Street,’ ‘international bankers,’ and ‘the Trusts,’ in order to 
have not only targets but ‘explanations’ for politics.” 39  Considering the above 
statement by Viereck, these words might suggest to us that those intellectuals 
menaced by McCarthyism so far had begun to entertain the concept of “right-wing 
populism.” 
 　 In November of 1964, Hofstadter contributed an article entitled “The Paranoid 
Style in American Politics” to  Harper’s Magazine , where he called the singularity 
of the extreme right wing like the John Birch Society or the Goldwater movement, 
“paranoid style,” as expressed in the conspiracy theory, “the fear of catastrophe,” 
the “extravagant passion for facts (occasionally they manufacture them),” the 
“curious leap in imagination,” and the cynicism to “effective two-way 
communication with the outside of their group.” 40  This characterization merits so 
much attention that right now “paranoid style” appears to be in vogue in mass 
media for explaining Trump tumult. 
 　 In this article, he also arguably suggested Populists were not rid of conspiracy 
theory, citing the preamble of the Populist Omaha Platform (1892), and “Populist 
Manifesto” (1895). 41 
 2.  Origin of the study of populism: International symposium in 1967 
 　 As I deem the international symposium on populism held in London in 1967 to 
be crucial for the launching of the study of populism, I will introduce the points of 
the report, Ionescu and Gellner eds.  Populism , to advance my discussion. 
 　 This book consists of two parts.  Part One treats populisms in the areas across 
the world, North America (the United States), Latin America, Russia, Eastern 
Europe, and Africa. 
 　 First of all, Richard Hofstadter, as a leader of the authors, introduced the 
Populist Movement in the United States (to be discussed later). 
 　 As for Latin America, not only urban populism like Peron’s movement in 
Argentina or Vargas’ in Brazil, but also rural populism such as Cardenass’ in 
Mexico or even Cuban Revolution were addressed. 
 　 Peasants’ movements in Russia and Eastern Europe were taken as a populism 
(narodnichestvo). 
 　 In the case of African populism, we seriously hear a general warning against 
 39. Daniel Bell, ed.,  Radical Right , 3.
 40. Richard Hofstadter,  The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and other essays (New 
York: Knopf, 1965), 37 ― 40.
 41. Richard Hofstadter,  Paranoid Style , 8. He cited “Populist Manifesto” from Frank 
McVey’s article. However, this document seems to be dubious as McVey did not specify where 
it came from. McVey, “The Populist Movement,” 201 ― 202.
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the elite who would manipulate the popular will to make private gains, by calling 
for “national unity.” 42 
 　 In Part Two, scholars made several efforts to formulate the definition of 
populism, in terms of ideology, social roots, or political movement.  After all, they 
obviously failed to reach any agreement about it.  Among them, however, a 
suggestion by Donald MacRae, “Populism is not about economics, politics or 
even, in the last resort, society.  It is about personality, and about personality in a 
moral sense.  Populism claims that the individual should be a complete man,” is 
still appreciative and insightful enough to understand the moralism at the roots of 
populism. 43 
 　 It is also worth attention that Peter Wiles, one of the authors, declared, “we 
must guard against a school of US historiography that traces McCarthyism to 
nineteenth-century North American populism.” What an irony it is that this 
statement was made in the face of Richard Hofstadter!  44 
 　 Another peculiarity of this report was that there is no chapter on populism in 
Western Europe, where currently storms of populism are said to be raging. 
Though, in Introduction, editors excused themselves for omitting Asia and Canada 
from the list of areas to be investigated, there was no mention of Western 
European populism, assumedly reflecting their presumption that Western Europe 
might be exempted from populism as it has a stable and reliable parliamentary 
democracy.  How about the United States, whose political system seems to be 
quite similar to that of Western Europe? How would Richard Hofstadter explain 
American Populism? 
 　 As a starter of the discussion, he attempted to explain American Populism, by 
emphasizing the “hard” side of American Populism, or “the American tradition of 
entrepreneurial radicalism,” arguing it was quite different from populisms in other 
areas in that they are based on peasants’ political cultures.  However, he was never 
silent on the “soft” side, or nostalgic mentality of American Populism, which was 
rather favorably construed by him to be returning to old republican civic virtue 
and high moralism.  Though he never denied Populists were obsessed with 
conspiracy theory, he referred to the difficulty they faced, not least, “an equally 
inflammatory rhetoric prevailed on the other side,” as if trying to defend Populists. 
At the closing of his essay, he declared, “In its general dedication to the popular 
interest and to positive government, populism left an important legacy to later 
reformers, particularly to those of the Progressive era and the New Deal.” 45  At 
this point, Hofstadter sounded like Hicks who stressed the continuity between 
Populism and Progressivism. 
 42. Ionescu & Gellner eds.,  Populism , Part One.
 43. Ionescu & Gellner eds.,  Populism , 160.
 44. Ionescu & Gellner eds.,  Populism , 177.
 45. Ionescu & Gellner eds.,  Populism , 9 ― 27.
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 　 More than that, we should pay careful attention to the fact that, in this paper, 
while he designated the Populist Movement in the United States at the end of 
nineteenth century as “Populist,” he used the term “populism” not only for 
populisms outside of the United States, but also for other populisms in America 
expressed connotatively as “American populism.” 46 
 　 Summing up, I reconfirm, in spite of its limitation, this symposium was crucial 
in the historiography of populism in the sense that it signified an important 
starting point for scholars to use the term or the concept of “populism” as a 
versatile tool for viewing political movements across the world, including those in 
America. 
 3.  New Populism: Populism as a social movement 
 　 In the 1960s, new left young radicals moved in the poverty-stricken urban 
communities to raise the participatory democracy there that they hoped would 
lead to social change.  Criticizing the movement by Saul Alinsky, the pioneer of 
the community organizing, as “an effort to provide therapeutic experiences to 
‘deprived’ people”, they tried to forge “an interracial movement of the poor.” 47 
However, their movement was short-lived.  They failed as they were outsiders in 
those communities, and their unusual political style rather invited mistrust of the 
residents. 
 　 Early in the 1970s, some white radicals, inheriting the legacy both of the new 
left and Alinsky, started a movement called “new populism” by themselves. 
“Citizen Action,” founded by Heather Booth and Steve Max, learning the lessons 
from the failure of the new left, evading the discussion of racial problem, and 
abstaining from using radical words like “the working class,” “socialism,” or 
“revolution,” sought to gain the support of the white middle class.  Yet, they could 
not stop the rightward turn of American politics, because they neither had media 
techniques the right wing had, nor the concrete economic program, for example, 
to solve the employment problem. 48 
 　 Jack Newfield, Jeff Greenfield, or Fred Harris, people connected with the 
Democratic Party, also called themselves “populists.” They called working people 
to mobilize as a majority against the elite in terms of self-interest.  However, they 
were just using a populist rhetoric lacking in any movement to support them from 
below.  Yet, in the meantime, the term “populism,” or “populist” came into vogue 
and gained its momentum as a political capital for the Democratic Party to regain 
 46. Ionescu & Gellner eds.,  Populism , 9 ― 27.
 47. Kazin,  Populist Persuasion , 200 ― 204.
 48. Kazin,  Populist Persuasion , 275; Harry C. Boyte, Heather Booth, & Steve Max,  Citizen 
Action and the New American Populism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986).
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the White House in 1992. 49 
 　 It is also noteworthy that they called themselves “ new populists.” “New” 
means they had some critical view of the original Populism.  Fred Harris 
explained, in his book  The New Populism , that while the original populism had a 
strain of racism, theirs was freed from it.  Newfield and Greenfield also 
maintained theirs was got rid of paranoid style or racism Populists suffered, 
arguing on the basis of the interpretation Hofstadter presented in  The Age of 
Reform .  This case is impressive enough to show us how influential Hofstadter’s 
view of Populism is among political activists as well in the intellectual circle, 
whether they would agree with him, or not. 50 
 　 Moreover, Newfield and Greenfield expressed their sympathy for Woodward 
who declared the New Deal was neo-Populism. “Populist Congressman” Tom 
Harkin also confessed he was deeply moved by Goodwyn’s  The  Populist 
Moment . 51  Anyway, these cases all tell us eloquently how people outside of the 
academia have been paying an attentive glance to Populism study to consult for 
their political future. 
 4.  Booming days of populists: From the middle of the 1980s 
 　 Concurrently with the development of the Populism study in the 1980s, 
“populist” came into “fashion,” as Michael Kazin called it, in American society at 
large. “Populist” as a word of compliment was mouthed loosely for musicians, 
film makers, athletes, at last, for cotton pants. 52 
 　 That phenomenon suggested to us that people, consciously or unconsciously, 
were tacitly protesting in a casual manner against the conservatization in the 
Reagan regime, which, to their stunning surprise, would be called “right wing 
 populism ” a decade later.  Who could imagine that?  53 
 5.  Study of populism as a research field: The 1990s 
 　 Into the 1990s, scholars as well as citizens have clearly recognized there 
existed, have existed, and exists a right wing populism other than the Populist 
Movement in American history. 
 49. Kazin,  Populist Persuasion , 275 ― 76; Jack Newfield & Jeff Greenfield,  A Populist 
Manifesto: The Making of a New Majority (New York: Praeger, 1972); Fred R. Harris,  The 
New Populism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1973).
 50. Harris,  New Populism , 206; Newfield & Greenfield,  Populist Manifesto , 17, 29.
 51. Newfield & Greenfield,  Populist Manifesto , 29; Harry C. Boyte et al.,  Citizen Action , 
159.
 52. Kazin,  Populist Persuasion , 270 ― 71.
 53. It seems to be amazing that political scientist Margaret Canovan paid keen attention to 
“reactionary populism” in the early 1980s. Margaret Canovan,  Populism , chapter 6.
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 　 In the middle of the 1990s, while political analyst Kevin Phillips predicted 
anti-Washington revolt would break out, Michael Kazin, originally a historian 
engaging in the study of the labor movement in Progressive Era San Francisco, 
published  The  Populist Persuasion , where he emphasized we should recognize the 
existence of populisms other than original Populism and make conscious efforts to 
investigate them. 54 
 　 Kazin’s populist language of which definition I introduced in the beginning of 
this paper, is epitomized in four clusters of beliefs; Americanism, people, elite, 
and the need for mass movements (=crusades).  From this point of view, he 
maintains that there appeared multiple populisms in American history other than 
the Populist Movement, taking such cases as AFL in the Gompers’ Era, 
Prohibition Movement, Father Coughlin’s, CIO in the New Deal Era, Cold War 
Rights, New lefts, George Wallace’s, Richard Nixon’s, and Ronald Reagan’s. 
Among them, he highlights right wing populisms that, starting from McCarthyism 
on, led to Reagan’s victory, sending out a warning that populism has been seized 
by the rights.  He never denies that there appears to be some similarities between 
the Populist Movement and right wing populisms, provoking further severe 
controversy.  More importantly, suggesting that populism has run all through 
American history, he has almost formulated the concept of populism as one of the 
traditional political cultures in America. 55 
 　 In the same decade, there were published two other significant books that also 
suggested the idea of populism as an American political tradition.  Eric Foner, in 
his book  The Story of American Freedom , after narrating American history from 
the colonial era to the Reagan Revolution in terms of freedom, finally issued a 
warning reminiscent of Kazin’s that American freedom has been seized by the 
conservatives. 56 
 　 Robert Wiebe wrote  Self-Rule , where he portrayed American history from the 
view point of democracy as self-rule, inclusive or exclusive, at the grassroots, 
whose ideas suggest a strong affinity with populism. 57 
 6.  Works on American populisms: From the 1990s to the present 
 　 In  The Populist Persuasion , Kazin paid just a running glance at both the 
movements in the pre-Populist era and the Populist Movement, stressing the 
inheritance of piety and enlightenment or people’s heroes like Jefferson, Jackson, 
 54. Kevin Phillips,  Arrogant Capital (New York: Little Brown, 1994); Kazin,  Populist 
Persuasion. 
 55. Kazin,  Populist Persuasion , 5 ― 6, 11 ― 17, 192 ― 93.
 56. Eric Foner,  The Story of American Freedom  (New York: Norton, 1998).
 57. Robert H. Wiebe,  Self-Rule: A Cultural History of American Democracy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995).
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or Lincoln.  However, other historians, seemingly shocked by the right turn of 
American politics, have begun to write about populisms in American history.  For 
example, as for the era before the Populist Movement, anti-Mason movement, or 
Know-nothing Party has begun to be written about as populism.  As for the right 
wing movements after the Populist Movement―e.g. the K.K.K. in the 1920s, 
Goldwater’s, George Wallace’s, or Reagan’s―increasing efforts have been made 
to depict them as populism. 58 
 　 Furthermore, we should not overlook the efforts made by historians like 
Catherine Stock to integrate study of vigilantism with that of populism.  Stock, 
also shocked by the blowing up of the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, 
attempted to trace the connection of agrarian radicalism with vigilantism in 
America history. 59 
 III:  Comparison between populisms and Populism 
 　 So far, we have discussed the historiographies of both Populism and populism. 
On the basis of these discussions, I will try to make comparison between them. 
 　 From the viewpoint of the definition of populism I proposed in the preface, we 
can see clear difference of “depth” of movement among them.  The Populist 
Movement, fully featured with language, style, ideas, movement, differed clearly 
from right wing populisms that have almost been only rhetorical, often empty of 
movement.  However, as we see right now, even those empty movements could be 
successful by deceptively manipulating the mass media. 
 　 We can point out as many similarities between them.  Kazin’s four clusters of 
beliefs―Americanism, people, elites, and the need for mass movements―are all 
shared by both. 
 　 Moreover, we should emphasize the existence of extremely strong anti-
politician, anti-party, or anti-politics sentiments held by people as an undercurrent 
of American political culture.  This, in a way, reflecting the widespread distrust of 
the representative democracy, actually represents the deep-rooted producerism, by 
which people would judge politicians, political parties or politics at large in 
skeptical eyes, as they all appear to be unproductive and parasitic. 
 58. Kazin,  Populist Persuasion , chapters 1, 2; Ronald P. Formisano,  For the People: 
American Populist Movements from the Revolution to the 1850s (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2008). Mark Voss-Hubbard,  Beyond Party: Cultures of Antipartisanship 
in Northern Politics before the Civil War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002); Johnston,  The Radical Middle Class;  Lisa McGirr,  Suburban Warriors: The Origins of 
the New American Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).  Alan Brinkley’s 
Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great Depression (New York: Knopf, 
1982) was an exceptionally early contribution to this field.
 59. Catherine M. Stock,  Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996).
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 　 Furthermore, we should not dismiss the strain of vigilantism that have 
overshadowed both Populism and populisms.  As Stock suggests, we are able to 
discern a strong affinity between populism and vigilantism.  Actually, as is well 
known, southern Populists were always suffering the acute tension and fear 
vigilantism was likely to cause.  Might it be too much to say we would perceive 
vigilantism flickering behind the Trump tumult? 
 American populism: Closing remarks 
 　 If you would try to search for “Hofstadter and Trump” on the internet, you 
could instantly hit several columns in major papers or magazines that explained 
the Trump tumult by applying Hofstadter’s “paranoid style” hypothesis. 60 
Confronting this situation, scholars engaging in the study of the Populist 
Movement might be cautious to take the defensive, remembering the bashing of 
Populism in the 1950s that had associated it with McCarthyism.  Or, would they 
jump to catch the “no-guilty” sentence issued by Jan-Werner Muller, as a boat of 
refuge? 
 　 As I have emphasized it over and over again, it is ahistorical to separate 
Populism from populism in American history.  American populism is a traditional 
political culture in America, I am convinced.  Therefore, Donald Trump as well as 
Joseph McCarthy should be understood in the context of American history, not as 
separate specters or aberrants. 
 　 How could historians writing on Populism treat populisms? I will recommend 
to probe and trace the relationships between Populism and populisms that 
preceded, paralleled, or followed it.  For example, we could inquire the 
relationship between Populism and the nativistic movements before and after it, or 
that between Populism and the concurrent demagogic movements by extreme 
racists like Ben Tillman in South Carolina, or James K. Vardaman in Mississippi. 
 　 Political scientist Paul Taggart maintains “the ideas of populism and its 
instinctive reaction against the institutions of representative politics have found 
fertile grounds in US politics.” “Populism should still be treated as a gauge of the 
health of representative politics.” 61  He means populism, working as a checker of 
representative politics, constitutes an integral part of American constitutional 
government, which accepts protesting movements or antagonistic political parties 
 60. Jeet Heer, “Donald Trump’s United States of Conspiracy,”  New Republic , June 14, 
2016; Thomas B. Edsall, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics is Back,”  The New York 
Times , September 8, 2016; Paul Musgrave, “Donald Trump is Normalizing Paranoia and 
Conspiracy Thinking in U.S. Politics,”  The Washington Post , January 12, 2017.
 61. Paul Taggart,  Populism (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), 41 ― 45; Paul 
Taggart, “Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics,” in  Democracy and the 
Populist Challenge , eds. Yves Mény and Yves Surel (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 73.
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 39 / 2017122
as practicing popular sovereignty. 
 　 Taggart again asserts “that American populism is seen as more American than 
populist.” Kazin also picked up Americanism as the first of four clusters of 
populist beliefs. 62  Expanding our discussion, I dare say, populism signifies 
inquiring the meaning of America, or, paraphrasing Goodwyn’s, inquiring 
democratic promise.  American populism is not “the permanent shadow of 
representative politics,” 63 but the symbiont of representative politics.  Sure, 
sometimes populism seems to threaten to destroy democracy, but if American 
populism would be extinguished, American democracy would perish, too. 
 
 62. Taggart,  Populism , 45; Kazin,  Populist Persuasion , 11.
 63. Müller,  What is Populism? , 101.
